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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: HOW ENDREW F. 
COULD AFFECT STRUGGLING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Michael S. Morgan* 
 
“The determination of when handicapped children are receiving 
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the 
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] presents a more 
difficult problem.”1 
– Justice Rehnquist, June 28, 1982 
“That ‘more difficult problem’ is before us today.”2 
– Chief Justice Roberts, March 22, 2017 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Speaking at his granddaughter’s high school graduation in Virginia, the 
late Justice Scalia offered the class of 2010 simple, yet thoughtful advice.3  
“Movement is not necessarily progress,” the Justice explained.4  “More 
important than your obligation to follow your conscience, or at least prior to 
it, is your obligation to form your conscience correctly.”5  Justice Scalia 
concluded his speech by offering his audience some candid guidance: “Good 
intentions are not enough.”6 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; Dual B.A., summa cum laude, 
2016, Seton Hall University. I would like to thank Professor Amy Newcombe for her 
invaluable feedback and assistance with the writing of this Comment.  I am also grateful to 
Professors Claudette St. Romain & John Kip Cornwell for their genuine advice and guidance 
throughout law school.  To my rock, Tiffani Mathikolonis, thank you for your unwavering 
love and support through thick and thin. To my parents, Stew and Kathy Morgan, thank you 
for your decades of dedication to a profession awfully undervalued. This Comment is 
dedicated to my soon-to-be-retired mother, whose years of teaching special education has 
bettered the lives of countless students with disabilities. You are proof that a single teacher 
can make all the difference. 
 1  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982). 
 2  Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017). 
 3  Kat Miller, Scalia Schools Other Commencement Addresses in His, WASH. TIMES 
(June 18, 2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2010/jun/18/scalia-
schools-other-commencement-addresses-his/. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
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Less than one year after Justice Scalia passed away,7 on January 17, 
2017 the surviving eight Justices heard oral argument8 for the case of Endrew 
F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1.9  The issue seemed relatively 
straightforward: how much educational “benefit” should public schools be 
required to provide to disabled students covered by the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?10  Finding an acceptable answer, 
however, proved to be more difficult.  Indeed, Justice Alito—the son of two 
public school teachers11—captured this difficulty with a simple remark:  
“What is frustrating about this case and about [the IDEA] is that we have a 
blizzard of words,” Justice Alito said.12  “[W]hat everybody seems to be 
looking for is the word that has just the right nuance to express this 
thought.”13  The “thought” to which Justice Alito alluded concerned just how 
much the federal government should demand of its public schools.14 
Throughout oral argument, the Court as a whole seemed bothered by 
the standard predominately used by the circuit courts—bothered that a 
modest “some benefit” standard was sufficient to satisfy the substantive 
requirement of the IDEA.15  But several Justices—both liberal and 
conservative—also showed an uneasiness about the possible financial 
burden that a change to the standard might impose on public schools.16  “[I]s 
there any place to discuss the cost that . . . would be incurred for, say, 
severely disabled students?” Justice Kennedy asked.17  Justice Breyer shared 
this concern.  “[T]he problem that’s working in my mind is if we suddenly 
adopt a new standard, all over the country we’ll have judges and lawyers . . . 
interpreting it differently,” Justice Breyer worried.18  “I foresee taking the 
money that ought to go to the children,” he cautioned, “and spending it on 
lawsuits and lawyers and all kinds of things that are extraneous.”19  It was 
 
 7  Justice Scalia passed away on February 13, 2016.  Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, 
Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
 8  See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-
1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
 9  137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 10  Id. at 997–98. 
 11  THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-2012, at 499 (Clare 
Cushman ed., 3d ed. 2013).  
 12  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 47. 
 13  Id. 
 14  See id. at 47–48.  
 15  See generally id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Face “Blizzard of Words” in Special 
Education Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politic 
s/supreme-court-special-education.html. 
 16  See Liptak, supra note 15.  
 17  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 9. 
 18  Id. at 14.  
 19  Id. at 15. 
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again Justice Alito, however, who neatly summarized the Court’s hesitancy 
with one question: “No matter how expensive it would be and no matter what 
the impact in . . . a poor school district would be on the general student 
population, cost can’t be considered?”20 
That is undoubtedly a loaded question, as this Comment will 
demonstrate.  It must first be noted, though, that the purpose of this Comment 
is not to criticize the (unquestionably) good intentions underlying Endrew F.  
Rather, this Comment aims to highlight the potential consequences of that 
decision, which may be overshadowed by those good intentions.  More 
specifically, this Comment will examine how struggling school districts may 
suffer under Endrew F.’s heightened educational standard.  Part II will 
discuss the historical development of special education law in the United 
States, culminating with the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA), and its successor, the IDEA.  Students covered by 
the IDEA are entitled to a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), but 
what exactly constitutes a FAPE has been a matter of controversy for quite 
some time.21  While school districts must provide disabled students with an 
individualized education program (“IEP”) that details the students’ required 
special education and related services, disputes arise when parents disagree 
with schools as to what those IEPs should require.22  Part III will discuss the 
circuit split that emerged in the wake of Board of Education of Hendrick 
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley,23 the landmark special education 
case preceding Endrew F.  Part IV will provide an analysis of Endrew F., 
examining the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the “some benefit” 
standard and replace it with one “markedly more demanding.”24  Part V will 
evaluate how Endrew F.’s new standard, although crafted with the best 
intentions, may nonetheless overburden struggling school districts.  Part VI 
will briefly conclude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20  Id. at 27. 
 21  DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 504 (2016). 
 22  Id. 
 23  458 U.S. 176 (1982).  
 24  See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017). 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Mental Health Reform’s “Bold New Approach” 
On January 20, 1961, nearly one million spectators gathered before the 
Capitol Building to watch a youthful, charismatic “Catholic boy” sworn in 
as the thirty-fifth President of the United States.25  The inauguration of forty-
three-year-old President John F. Kennedy signaled a breath of fresh air for a 
generation exhausted by war.  And while the Cold War necessitated that 
foreign policy remained the core priority of his administration, President 
Kennedy’s familial connection to mental disability suggested that mental 
health reform would be an important part of the New Frontier.26  Indeed, less 
than nine months after his inauguration, on October 17, 1961, President 
Kennedy appointed the President’s Panel on Mental Retardation, a twenty-
seven-member panel comprised of “outstanding scientists, doctors, and 
others.”27  The panel’s task was straightforward, yet daunting: develop a 
national plan to combat deficiencies in mental health treatment.28 
Only one year later, on October 16, 1962, the panel presented its report 
to the President, providing over one hundred recommendations regarding 
methods of research, treatment, and education.29  In light of the panel’s 
report, on February 5, 1963, President Kennedy issued a “Special Message 
to the Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation,” urging Congress 
to take “a bold new approach” toward mental health reform.30  His particular 
plea for special education was clear: 
I am asking the Office of Education to place a new emphasis on 
research in the learning process, expedite the application of 
research findings to teaching methods for the mentally retarded, 
 
 25  The Inauguration of John F. Kennedy, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & 
MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Exhibits/Permanent-Exhibits/The-Inauguration-of- 
President-Kennedy.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).  
 26  See John F. Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/JFK-and-
People-with-Intellectual-Disabilities.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) [hereinafter John F. 
Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities].  President Kennedy’s younger sister, 
Rosemary, was born in 1918 with a mental disability.  Id.  In 1946, President Kennedy’s 
father, Joseph, along with his mother, Rose, established the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation, 
“in memory of their eldest son” who had been killed in action during World War II.  Id.  The 
Foundation sought to improve awareness and treatment of those with mental disabilities, and 
was overseen by President Kennedy’s other sister, Eunice Kennedy Shriver.  Id.  Eunice was 
instrumental in pushing mental health reform as a priority of President Kennedy’s 
administration.  Id. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
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support studies on improvement of curricula, develop teaching 
aids, and stimulate the training of special [education] teachers.31 
Eight months later, on October 24, 1963, Congress passed the Maternal and 
Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning Amendment to the Social 
Security Act.32  It was considered the first major piece of legislation aimed 
towards mental health reform.33  Only one week after, on October 31, 1963, 
President Kennedy signed into law the Community Mental Health Act, 
which provided funding for the establishment of mental health facilities 
focused on the treatment and care of people with mental disabilities.34  This 
bill, however, would be the last piece of legislation President Kennedy 
signed into law—he was assassinated just three weeks later.35  But the 
assassination of President Kennedy would not curb the progress he had 
started toward mental health reform.  Befittingly, the President’s brother, 
Robert Kennedy, would rejuvenate the effort toward improved awareness of 
those with mental disabilities.36 
In the autumn of 1965, two years after his brother’s death, Senator 
Robert Kennedy made an unexpected visit to the infamous Willowbrook 
State School, touring the children’s psychiatric institution and publicly 
equating it to a “snake pit.”37  While testifying before the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Mental Health Retardation and Physical Handicap in 
September 1965, Senator Kennedy endeavored to steer public attention 
toward the decrepit conditions that had for decades plagued psychiatric 
institutions.38  On the heels of Senator Kennedy’s commentary, then-Boston 
University Professor Burton Blatt, along with photographer Fred Kaplan, 
visited several psychiatric institutions in December 1965.39  The 
environments they encountered at these various institutions motivated the 
duo to document their experiences in Christmas in Purgatory: A 
 
 31  CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1933-1973, at 1548 
(Robert H. Bremner et al. eds., 1974). 
 32  John F. Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities, supra note 26. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. 
 35 President Kennedy, just forty-six years old, was assassinated in Dallas, Texas on 
November 22, 1963.  DeeNeen Brown, The Day John F. Kennedy Was Killed: How America 
Mourned a Fallen President, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/26/how-america-mourned-john-f-kennedy-images-of-grief-for-
a-fallen-president/?utm_term=.878e24e821ec. 
 36  See PAUL J. CASTELLANI, FROM SNAKE PITS TO CASH COWS: POLITICS AND PUBLIC 
INSTITUTIONS IN NEW YORK 117 (2005).  
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 118. 
 39  Steven J. Taylor, Christmas in Purgatory: A Retrospective Look, 44 AM. ASS’N ON 
MENTAL RETARDATION 145, 145 (2006).  
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Photographic Essay on Mental Retardation,40 which brought photographic 
recognition to the ignored world of mental disability.  Indeed, the latter half 
of the 1960s ushered in a new era of collective mindfulness regarding mental 
disability and soon spurred advancement in special education at the turn of 
the decade.41 
Prior to the 1970s, public schools routinely closed their doors to 
students with disabilities, depriving them of a proper education by 
segregating them from the general student population.42  But this notion of 
segregation-in-education came under fire in 1954, after a unanimous 
Supreme Court “conclude[d] that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”43  The Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education established the right to equal educational opportunity and set a 
precedent against racial segregation in public education.44  The landmark 
decision, however, would improve more than just the educational 
opportunities of students from racial minorities.  Indeed, proponents of 
students with disabilities used Brown’s reasoning in advocating that disabled 
students should have the same access to education as nondisabled students.45 
Change in special education law came shortly thereafter, driven by two 
seminal decisions: Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) 
v. Pennsylvania,46 and Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia.47  
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children challenged the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s statutory-exclusion of mentally disabled 
students from public schools.48  The Court in PARC held that mentally 
disabled students could not be denied access to a free and adequate public 
education, establishing the precedent that would be used to dismantle 
exclusionary education laws in other states.49  Only one year later, in 1972, 
Mills took that precedent one step further.  The Court in Mills extended 
PARC’s doctrine to not just mentally disabled students, but to all disabled 
students.50  These two cases put Washington on notice, and shortly thereafter 
 
 40  BURTON BLATT & FRED KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY: A PHOTOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
ON MENTAL RETARDATION (1974). 
 41  See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 42  BLACK, supra note 21, at 469. 
 43  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 44  See id. at 495–96.  
 45  BLACK, supra note 21, at 469. 
 46  343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).  
 47  348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  
 48  BLACK, supra note 21, at 469. 
 49  Id.  
 50  Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878; see also BLACK, supra note 21, at 469. 
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Congress opened an investigation into the state of special education.51 
The findings were sobering.  Congress discovered that millions of 
disabled children were being poorly educated, if at all.52  Indeed, as revealed 
by the Senate Report that later accompanied the EAHCA, it was estimated 
that 
of the more than 8 million children (between birth and twenty-one 
years of age) with handicapping conditions requiring special 
education and related services, only 3.9 million such children 
[were] receiving an appropriate education.  1.75 million 
handicapped children [were] receiving no educational services at 
all, and 2.5 million handicapped children [were] receiving an 
inappropriate education.53 
In light of these findings, Congress shifted its attention toward statutory 
reform for students with disabilities.54  Accordingly, in 1975 Congress 
passed—and President Ford reluctantly signed into law55—the 142nd piece 
of legislation of the 94th Congress: the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act.56  “Incorporat[ing] the major principles of the right to 
 
 51  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982). 
 52  S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975). 
 53  Id. 
 54  BLACK, supra note 21, at 470. 
 55  Statement on Signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5413 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2018).  The following is an excerpt from President Ford’s official statement on 
signing the EAHCA on December 2, 1975: 
Unfortunately, this bill promises more than the Federal Government can 
deliver, and its good intentions could be thwarted by the many unwise 
provisions it contains.  Everyone can agree with the objective stated in the title 
of this bill—educating all handicapped children in our Nation.  The key 
question is whether the bill will really accomplish that objective.  Even the 
strongest supporters of this measure know as well as I that they are falsely 
raising the expectations of the groups affected by claiming authorization levels 
which are excessive and unrealistic.  Despite my strong support for full 
educational opportunities for our handicapped children, the funding levels 
proposed in this bill will simply not be possible if Federal expenditures are to 
be brought under control and a balanced budget achieved over the next few 
years.  There are other features in the bill which I believe to be objectionable 
and which should be changed. It contains a vast array of detailed, complex, 
and costly administrative requirements which would unnecessarily assert 
Federal control over traditional State and local government functions.  It 
establishes complex requirements under which tax dollars would be used to 
support administrative paperwork and not educational programs.  
Unfortunately, these requirements will remain in effect even though the 
Congress appropriates far less than the amounts contemplated in [the 
EAHCA]. 
Id. 
 56  Timothy Ilg & Charles Russo, Funding Special Education and the IDEA: Promises, 
Promises, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND LAW: INTERSECTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE PROVISION 
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education cases,”57 the EAHCA required all schools receiving federal 
funding to provide a FAPE to all disabled children covered by the Act.58  In 
1990, the EAHCA was retitled as the IDEA, but its substantive and 
procedural protections remained practically the same.59 
B. The IDEA: How Does it Work? 
Under the IDEA, states must adhere to certain procedural and 
substantive requirements in exchange for federal funding toward the excess 
costs of special education.60  First, school districts must determine whether a 
student is eligible under the IDEA.61  Despite references to “all children with 
disabilities” in common law rhetoric and legislative history, not all disabled 
children are, in fact, eligible under the IDEA.62  Instead, the IDEA defines 
an eligible child as one “(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments 
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or 
specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special 
education and related services.”63  In other words, eligibility under the IDEA 
requires that a child: (1) have a type of disability enumerated in the IDEA 
that “adversely affects [the] child’s educational performance,” and (2) need 
“special education” and “related services” as a result of that disability.64 
The IDEA defines “special education” as “specially designed 
instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, 
including . . . instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in 
hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and . . . instruction in 
physical education.”65  Furthermore, “related services” are defined as 
“transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive 
services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit 
 
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 101 (Karen DeMoss & Kenneth Wong eds., 2004). 
 57  S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2 
(1982). 
 58  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). 
 59  See Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through 
IDEA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 60  BLACK, supra note 21, at 471. 
 61  Id. at 501–02.  
 62  Id.  
 63  20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). 
 64  BLACK, supra note 21, at 471; see also 34 C.F.R § 300.8(c) (2017).  
 65  20 U.S.C. § 1401(29); see also BLACK, supra note 21, at 471 (“The IDEA defines 
‘special education’ as the adaptation of the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction 
to address a child’s unique needs and to ensure access to the general curriculum.”) (citing 34 
C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3)). 
MORGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2019  6:52 PM 
2019] COMMENT 785 
from special education . . . .”66  Such services may include “speech-language 
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological 
services, physical and occupational therapy, . . . therapeutic recreation, 
social work services, . . . rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility 
services, and medical services . . . .”67  Not all children with an enumerated 
disability, however, qualify under this two-prong prerequisite.  For example, 
a child with spina bifada may require catheterization services, or a child with 
cystic fibrosis may require respiratory therapy, but such services would not 
qualify as “special education” unless the disability adversely affected the 
child’s educational performance.68  Put simply, if a child needs “related 
services” but not “special education,” then that child is not eligible under the 
IDEA.69 
Once a child is deemed eligible under the IDEA, the school district has 
an affirmative obligation to create an IEP for the child, which must be 
specifically tailored to provide the child with a FAPE.70  The IEP is the 
linchpin of the child’s educational curriculum; it is the mechanism through 
which the majority of IDEA-services operate.71  As Professor Derek Black72 
explains, the IEP “is the basic plan of education for the child,” and must 
incorporate the child’s “current educational performance, annual goals and 
short-term objectives, the extent to which the child can take part in general 
education, the date services are to begin and how long they will be offered, 
and the criteria to evaluate whether the student is achieving his or her 
goals.”73  Arguably the most important—and most contentious—issue 
involving the creation of an IEP is whether it provides the child with a FAPE. 
The child’s IEP must be uniquely constructed to provide the child with 
a FAPE.74  The IDEA defines FAPE as “special education” and “related 
services” which: “[(1)] have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; [(2)] meet the standards of 
the State educational agency; [(3)] include an appropriate . . . education in 
the State involved; and [(4)] are provided in conformity with the [child’s 
 
 66  20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).  
 67  Id.  
 68  BLACK, supra note 21, at 472. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. at 501. 
 71  Id. at 503. 
 72  Derek Black is a Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina School of Law.  
David Hopper, Derek Black, South Carolina University—Federal Education Right, ACAD. 
MINUTE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://academicminute.org/2018/02/derek-black-south-carolina-
university-federal-education-right/ (explaining that “[t]he focus of [Professor Black’s] current 
scholarship is the intersection of constitutional law and public education, particularly as it 
pertains to educational equality and fairness for disadvantaged students”). 
 73  BLACK, supra note 21, at 503; see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 74  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). 
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IEP].”75  A federal circuit split emerged, however, as to what constituted an 
appropriate education; indeed, the term was as ambiguous as it was 
ambitious.  This statutory language created a hotbed of inconsistent 
jurisprudence and eventually grabbed the Supreme Court’s attention in the 
autumn of 1981.76  One year later, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve 
the issue in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley.77 
C. The Stakes of Special Education: All Roads Lead to Rowley 
In 1982, the Court in Rowley addressed the issue as to when an 
education is sufficiently “appropriate” to satisfy the FAPE requirement 
under the IDEA.78  Plaintiff Amy Rowley was a first-grade student at 
Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District of 
New York.79  Rowley had a hearing impairment, and as a result, she was 
offered an IEP that required she be educated in a regular classroom and 
receive additional instruction from both a special tutor for the deaf and a 
speech therapist.80  The school district proposed that Rowley’s regular 
classroom instructor speak through a wireless transmitter, which would 
amplify the instructor’s voice by means of a hearing aid worn by Rowley.81  
Rowley’s parents, however, insisted that the school district instead provide 
an interpreter in all of Rowley’s classes.82  The school district refused, and 
Rowley’s parents subsequently sought administrative review before an 
independent examiner.83  The examiner found an interpreter to be 
unnecessary because Rowley “was achieving educationally, academically, 
and socially without such assistance.”84  In response, Rowley’s parents filed 
a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, claiming that the school’s 
refusal to provide an interpreter had denied Rowley a FAPE under the 
IDEA.85 
 
 
 75  Id. § 1401(9) (emphasis added).  
 76  See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id.  Rowley involved an analysis of the IDEA’s statutory precursor, the EAHCA.  Id.  
Still, the same textual language has predominately carried over to today’s version of the 
IDEA.  Compare id. at 187–89 (quoting EAHCA definitions), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), 
(26), (29) (current IDEA definitions). 
 79  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Id.  
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 185.  
 84  Id.  
 85  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185–86.  
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The District Court agreed with Rowley’s parents, finding that Rowley 
had, in fact, been denied a FAPE.86  The District Court held that Rowley’s 
education was not “appropriate” unless it afforded her “an opportunity to 
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to 
other children.”87  A divided Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address the pressing question of what constituted a 
FAPE under the IDEA.88  In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist, 
the Court established a twofold assessment to determine whether a school 
had provided a FAPE: (1) the school must “compl[y] with the procedures set 
forth in the [IDEA]”; and (2) the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits.”89  If these two requirements 
were met, the Court reasoned, then the school district had fulfilled its 
obligation under the IDEA—“courts [could] require no more.”90  Finding 
that Rowley’s IEP was reasonably calculated to provide her with an 
educational benefit, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit.91  
In doing so, however, the Court inadvertently92 set the standard for what 
constituted “appropriate education” under the IDEA: an IEP must be 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive an educational benefit.93  
Yet, “[t]he determination of when handicapped children are receiving 
sufficient educational benefits,” the Court acknowledged, “present[ed] a 
more difficult problem.”94 
Indeed, inconsistencies emerged among the federal circuits regarding 
interpretation of the phrase “educational benefit.”95  Some courts interpreted 
Rowley as requiring no more than “some educational benefit,”96 whereas 
other courts interpreted the decision as demanding a heightened “meaningful 
educational benefit.”97  The distinction was significant because schools were 
 
 86  Id.  
 87  Id. at 186.  
 88  Id.   
 89  Id. at 206–07.  
 90  Id.  
 91  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.  
 92  Id. at 202 (“The [IDEA] requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of 
handicapped children . . . .  It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the 
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with 
infinite variations in between. . . .  We do not attempt today to establish any one 
test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children 
covered by the [IDEA].”).  
 93  Id. at 206–07. 
 94  Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
 95  See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of 
How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–4 (2009) (discussing the 
differences among the federal circuits in applying the Rowley standard). 
 96  BLACK, supra note 21, at 511. 
 97  Id. 
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frequently involved in litigation regarding their obligations under the 
IDEA.98  One of the most contested issues concerned whether parents were 
entitled to tuition reimbursement for private schooling when the reason for 
withdrawing their child from public school was the public school’s alleged 
failure to provide the child with a FAPE.99  In 1993, the Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in Florence County School District Four v. Carter.100  
The Court’s decision in Carter established a parental right to tuition 
reimbursement, even when parents “unilaterally withdraw their child from a 
public school that provides an inappropriate public education under [the] 
IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education that is 
otherwise proper under [the] IDEA.”101 
While the IDEA made noteworthy progress in terms of educating 
children with disabilities, Congress realized that it needed to do more to 
“improv[e] the quality of services . . . and transitional results . . . obtained by 
[disabled] students.”102  Accordingly, Congress twice reauthorized and 
amended the IDEA, first in 1997 and again in 2004.103  Ironically, however, 
these amendments all but confirmed that Congress knew the IDEA was 
drastically underfunded, yet intended to wash its hands of the responsibility 
regardless.  When Congress originally passed the EAHCA, it agreed to fund 
forty percent of the national average per-pupil expenditure by 1982.104  That 
is, Congress promised to pay forty percent of the “excess costs” associated 
with educating students with disabilities.105  But once Congress realized that 
it could never satisfy that threshold, it later amended the IDEA, changing the 
forty percent figure to a “maximum funding goal, rather than a 
requirement.”106  As such, Congress openly acknowledged its inability to 
pull its own weight, shifting the burden onto states and their local school 
districts.  Indeed, aside from a “multiyear boost” linked to the federal 
stimulus package in 2009, for the past forty-two years Congress has 
repeatedly failed to even come close to its forty percent benchmark.107  As 
of 2017, the federal government covered only sixteen percent of the costs 
 
 98  Id. at 545. 
 99  Id. 
 100  510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
 101  Id. at 9.  
 102  S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 14 (1996); see also S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 6 (2003). 
 103  See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, 111 Stat. 37; see also Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647. 
 104  Christina A. Samuels, Decades of Progress, Challenges Under Federal Special 
Education Law, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/11/ 
11/decades-of-progress-challenges-under-federal-special.html. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. (emphasis added).  
 107  Id.  
MORGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2019  6:52 PM 
2019] COMMENT 789 
associated with the IDEA.108 
Nonetheless, five years after the IDEA’s latest amendment, the 
Supreme Court further stretched the IDEA’s scope in Forest Grove School 
District v. T. A.109  There, the Court determined whether the amended-IDEA 
prohibited tuition reimbursement where a child did not first receive “special 
education and related services” from the public school.110  Writing for the 
6-3 majority, Justice Stevens concluded that the “IDEA authorizes 
reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services when a 
school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is 
appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special 
education or related services through the public school.”111 
The dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Scalia, and Thomas, emphasized 
that the IDEA was envisioned to promote collaboration between parents and 
school districts toward a mutual goal: an appropriate education for the 
disabled child.112  Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter sympathized with 
the concerns of school districts, because “special education can be 
immensely expensive, amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually and 
as much as [twenty percent] of public schools’ general operating budgets.”113  
“Given the burden of private school placement,” Justice Souter reasoned, “it 
makes good sense to require parents to try to devise a satisfactory alternative 
within the public schools.”114  This fiscal controversy has generated a clash 
between parents of students with disabilities and struggling school 
districts—one that federal circuits have grappled with differently in the 
thirty-five years following Rowley. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION 4 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget17/summary/17 
summary.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY]. 
 109  557 U.S. 230 (2009). 
 110  Id.  
 111  Id. at 247.  
 112  Id. at 249–60. 
 113  Id. at 258. 
 114  Id. at 260. 
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE WAKE OF ROWLEY 
A. Tale of Two Standards: “Some Benefit” or “Meaningful Benefit” 
Ever since Rowley, the requirement for providing a FAPE has been 
interpreted differently among the federal circuits.115  Some circuit courts 
have applied a “some educational benefit” standard,116 while others have 
applied a “meaningful educational benefit” standard.117  While some scholars 
have disagreed as to which standard has been the majority approach,118 both 
interpretations were borne out of Rowley’s majority opinion.119  The circuit 
courts that used the “some benefit” standard drew their understanding from 
the passage in Rowley which states: “implicit in the congressional purpose 
of providing access to a ‘free appropriate public education’ is the 
requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to 
confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”120  
Conversely, those circuit courts that used the “meaningful benefit” standard 
derived their interpretation from the following passage: “in seeking to 
provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the 
States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary 
to make such access meaningful.”121  This subtle difference in interpretation, 
however, sharply divided the federal circuits. 
B. The Best of Times (Allegedly): The “Meaningful Benefit” Standard 
The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits utilized the 
“meaningful benefit” standard, interpreting Rowley as requiring schools to 
provide an IEP reasonably calculated to provide the student with a 
“meaningful” educational benefit.  In Mrs. B. v.  Milford Board of 
Education,122 the Second Circuit explicitly held that “[w]hile the [IDEA] 
 
 115  See Wenkart, supra note 95, at 1–4. 
 116  See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 
2008).  
 117  See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elem. Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 118  Compare Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Is No Longer Good 
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley 
Definition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J. L. & EDUC. 5, 20–21 (2012) (finding 
that case law indicates that the majority of circuit courts adhere to the “some educational 
benefit” standard), with Scott Goldschmidt, A New Idea for Special-Education Law: 
Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful 
Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2011) (stating “a 
slight majority” of circuits require “a heightened-educational-benefit standard,” also known 
as the “meaningful educational benefit” standard). 
 119  See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 120  Id. at 200 (emphasis added).  
 121  Id. at 192 (emphasis added).  
 122  103 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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does not authorize a court to impose a particular substantive educational 
standard on the state or to require equality of opportunity for the handicapped 
in education . . . a state IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide some 
‘meaningful’ benefit.”123  The Second Circuit reaffirmed this stance in Cerra 
v. Pawling Central School District,124 finding that public schools satisfied 
their FAPE requirements when they offered an IEP that was “likely to 
produce progress, not regression,” and afforded disabled students “with an 
opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial advancement.’”125 
In Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate, the Third Circuit found 
that the IDEA was “inten[ded] to afford more than a trivial amount of 
educational benefit” to students with disabilities.126  Cautioning against the 
interpretation of Rowley where “the conferral of any benefit, no matter how 
small, [would] qualify as ‘appropriate education’ under the [IDEA],” the 
Third Circuit instead found that the IDEA required “an education that would 
confer meaningful benefit” upon students with disabilities.127  The Fifth 
Circuit in Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District v. Michael F. 
echoed this rationale.128  While recognizing that “the IDEA guarantees only 
a ‘basic floor of opportunity’ for every disabled child,” the Fifth Circuit 
found that the IDEA required an educational benefit more than “mere 
modicum or de minimis.”129  Citing with approval the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Polk, the Fifth Circuit held that “the educational benefit [] an IEP 
is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful.’”130  In Deal v. Hamilton County 
Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit held that “the IDEA require[d] an IEP 
to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the 
potential of the child at issue.”131  And the Ninth Circuit, in N.B. v. Hellgate 
Elementary School District,132 interpreted the amendments to the IDEA as 
requiring schools to “provide a student with a ‘meaningful benefit’ in order 
to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA.”133  These federal 
circuits plainly interpreted Rowley as requiring schools to provide a 
“meaningful” educational benefit to disabled students covered by the IDEA. 
 
 123  Id. at 1120.  
 124  427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 125  Id. at 195.  
 126  853 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 127  Id. at 184.  
 128  118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 129  Id. at 248.  
 130  Id.  
 131  392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 132  541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 133  Id. at 1213.  
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C. The Worst of Times (Allegedly): The “Some Benefit” Standard 
The First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits utilized 
the “some benefit” standard, interpreting Rowley as requiring schools to 
provide an IEP reasonably calculated to provide the student with “some” 
educational benefit.  In Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School 
District,134 the First Circuit diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Hellgate, finding that the amendments to the IDEA did not supplant the 
“some benefit” standard adopted in Rowley.135  Plaintiff Stephanie Lessard 
had been “diagnosed with moderate mental retardation . . . cognitive delays, 
speech impairments, a seizure disorder . . . and partial paralysis of her left 
side.”136  Lessard’s IEP included, among other things, a customary reading 
program designed to increase her literary proficiency.137  Lessard’s parents, 
however, advocated for a more specialized program,138 one that had been 
recommended by their daughter’s personal psycholinguist.139  The school 
declined to adopt the parent’s proposal because its employees were not 
qualified under the suggested educational methodology.140 
While Lessard’s parents “[did] not contest that [Lessard] was the 
beneficiary of a standard, multisensory reading methodology,” they 
nonetheless claimed that their daughter’s reading program “produced a level 
of progress . . . beneath what [she] was capable of attaining.”141  The First 
Circuit ruled in favor of the school district, finding that “an inquiring court 
ought not to condemn [a chosen] methodology ex post merely because the 
disabled child’s progress [did] not meet the parents’ . . . expectations.”142  
Finding that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA did not supplant Rowley, the 
First Circuit held that in order to satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirement, 
“[a]n IEP need only supply ‘some educational benefit,’ not an optimal or an 
ideal level of educational benefit.”143 
Similarly, in O.S. v. Fairfax County School Board,144 the Fourth Circuit 
declined to find that Congress annulled Rowley by means of the IDEA’s 2004 
amendment.145  “Without any express acknowledgment of [Congressional] 
intent to . . . abrogate[] Supreme Court precedent[,]” the Fourth Circuit 
 
 134  518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 21. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id.  
 140  Lessard, 518 F.3d at 21. 
 141  Id. at 28.  
 142  Id. at 29.  
 143  Id. at 23. 
 144  804 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 145  Id. at 360. 
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rejected the contention that a “meaningful benefit” standard had replaced the 
“some benefit” standard originally set forth in Rowley.146  As such, the 
Fourth Circuit reiterated the unmistakable standard within its jurisdiction: “a 
school provides a FAPE so long as a child receives some educational benefit, 
meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial.”147 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke 
P.148 endorsed the “some benefit” standard used by its sister circuits.  The 
decision, however, ultimately drew strong criticism in the wake of its 
author’s future Supreme Court confirmation hearing.149  Plaintiff Luke’s 
parents sought tuition reimbursement after they withdrew their autistic child 
from a Colorado public school and placed him in a Massachusetts private 
residential program that specialized in educating children with autism.150  
Although Luke had made recognizable progress in public school from 
kindergarten through second grade, at home he developed severe behavioral 
problems that soon carried over into the public setting.151  Understandably 
concerned, Luke’s parents explored residential options for their son, and 
settled on the Boston Higashi School (“BHS”).152  Under BHS’s program, 
Luke lived on the BHS campus for forty-four weeks of the year, and was 
supervised by BHS educators and staff for twenty-four hours a day.153  In 
response to a request for tuition reimbursement by Luke’s parents, the public 
school offered Luke a final, revised IEP that “incorporated virtually all of 
 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id.  
 148  540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 149  Senator Dick Durbin questioned Justice Gorsuch, the author of the Thompson decision, 
about why he had “rejected not only the judgment of the federal district court, but also the 
judgment of a hearing officer and the Colorado State administrative law judge.”  Valerie 
Strauss, Why the Word ‘Merely’ Turned Many Advocates For Students With Disabilities 
Against Gorsuch, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer 
-sheet/wp/2017/04/07/why-the-word-merely-turned-many-advocates-for-students-with-disa 
bilities-against-gorsuch/?utm_term=.a1d73fec8545. After quoting language from Endrew 
F.’s superseding decision, which ironically was handed down on the third day of Justice 
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, Senator Durbin pushed Justice Gorsuch with the following 
question: “why in your early decision did you want to lower the bar so low to merely more 
than de minimis as a standard for public education to meet [the] federal requirement under the 
[IDEA]?”  Id.  A somber Justice Gorsuch replied, “[i]f anyone is suggesting that I like a result 
where an autistic child happens to lose, that’s a heartbreaking accusation to me.  
Heartbreaking.  But the fact of the matter is I was bound by circuit precedent and so was the 
panel of my court.”  Nikita Vladimirov, Gorsuch: I’m ‘Sorry’ For Ruling Against Autistic 
Student, HILL (Mar. 22, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/325318-gorsuch-i-was-
wrong-to-rule-against-autistic-student. The Justice concluded apologetically, “[i]f I was 
wrong . . . I was wrong because I was bound by circuit precedent and I’m sorry.”  Id.  
 150  Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1146.  
 151  Id.  
 152  Id.   
 153  Id.   
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the goals requested by [Luke’s] parents,” except that it proposed placement 
in the public school rather than at BHS.154  Luke’s parents rejected the IEP.155 
Then-Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch156 wrote for a unanimous 
panel, reversing the District Court’s finding that Luke had been denied a 
FAPE.157  While it was “sympathetic to Luke’s parents’ desire to see their 
child thrive,” the Tenth Circuit nonetheless was “constrained to reverse” 
because, in the Court’s view, Rowley required only that an IEP be reasonably 
calculated to confer “some educational benefit,” which must simply be 
“more than de minimis.”158  Accordingly, “[b]ecause every factfinder to have 
assessed [the] case ha[d] found that Luke was making progress in the public 
school,” the Tenth Circuit held that the school district had satisfied its 
obligation under the IDEA.159  In doing so, the Tenth Circuit fell squarely in 
line with the “some benefit” standard.160  This line of reasoning, however, 
soon attracted the Supreme Court’s attention. 
IV. THE ENDREW F. DECISION: RAISING THE BAR, BUT HOW HIGH? 
A. The Beginning of the End: Endrew F. Goes to Washington 
While Rowley interpreted the IDEA as establishing a substantive right 
to a “free appropriate public education” for students with disabilities, it did 
not endorse any one test for determining “when handicapped children [were] 
receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the 
[IDEA].”161  But on March 22, 2017—thirty-five years after Rowley—the 
Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue in Endrew F. v. Douglas 
County School District RE-1.162 
 
 154  Id. at 1147. 
 155  Id.   
 156  In 2008, when Thompson was decided, Justice Gorsuch was a judge on the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Carrie Severino, Setting the Record Straight on Gorsuch and 
Disabilities, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/sett 
ing-record-straight-gorsuch-and-disabilities.  On April 10, 2017, Justice Gorsuch was sworn 
in as the 113th Justice of the Supreme Court.  Robert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Neil M. 
Gorsuch Sworn In as 113th Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuch-to-be-sworn-in-to-supreme-
court-today-in-two-ceremonies/2017/04/10/9ac361fe-1ddb-11e7-ad74-3a742a6e93a7_story. 
html?utm_term=.e95ce162cf4c. 
 157  Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1155.  
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 1145.  
 160  See, e.g., O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 360 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
under the “some benefit” standard, “a school provides a FAPE so long as a child receives 
some educational benefit, meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial”). 
 161  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982). 
 162  137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
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Petitioner Endrew was diagnosed with autism at the age of two.163  As 
a result, Endrew experienced impaired cognitive functioning, reduced social 
and communicative skills, and behavioral issues.164  His teachers fondly 
described him as having a “sweet disposition,” a child with a sense of humor 
who “showed concern for friends.”165  Endrew attended public school in the 
Douglas County School District (“Douglas County”) from preschool through 
fourth grade, receiving an IEP each year designed to address both his 
functional and educational needs.166  Endrew made satisfactory progress 
throughout his preschool and kindergarten years, but by second grade his 
behavioral issues began to interfere with his educational development.167  In 
response, Douglas County incorporated a behavioral intervention plan 
(“BIP”) into Endrew’s third-grade IEP, which approximately tripled the 
amount of time Endrew spent with a “significant-support-needs” instructor 
or paraprofessional aide to thirty-three-and-a-half hours a week.168  Endrew’s 
third-grade IEP also incorporated assistance from a mental-health 
professional and speech-language therapist.169 Despite these 
implementations, however, Endrew’s behavioral issues continued to affect 
his educational development, carrying over into the fourth grade.170 
As such, Endrew’s parents understandably became dissatisfied with 
their son’s progress during his fourth-grade year.171  Although Endrew had 
demonstrated progress towards some of his goals and objectives, he still 
“exhibited multiple behaviors that inhibited his ability to access learning in 
the classroom.”172  These behaviors included screaming in class, climbing 
over classroom furniture and other children, and occasionally running away 
from school; he also developed fears of ordinary things such as flies and 
public restrooms.173  This behavioral regression ultimately stalled Endrew’s 
academic progress.174 
 
 
 
 
 163  Id. at 996. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  See Brief for Respondent at 8, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827) [hereinafter 
Brief for Respondent]. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id.  
 169  Id.   
 170  Id.   
 171  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996. 
 172  Id.   
 173  Id.   
 174  Id. 
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Endrew’s subsequent IEPs, from his parents’ view, seemed to simply 
carry over the same learning objectives from one year to the next, “indicating 
that [Endrew] was failing to make meaningful progress toward his aims.”175  
Despite Endrew’s proposed fifth-grade IEP calling for an increase in hours 
with a “significant-support-needs” instructor and paraprofessional aide, a 
new BIP, and potential guidance from an autism specialist,176 Endrew’s 
parents still viewed the proposed IEP as “pretty much the same as his past 
ones.”177  Endrew’s parents believed that “only a thorough overhaul” of the 
school district’s methodology toward Endrew’s behavioral issues could 
break his academic stagnation.178  But because Douglas County allegedly 
could not provide this for Endrew, his parents withdrew him from the public 
school and enrolled him at Firefly Autism House (“Firefly”) in May 2010.179 
During his time at Firefly, Endrew fared much better than in public 
school.180  The private autism center developed a BIP that identified and 
addressed Endrew’s behavioral problems, and consequently, within months 
Endrew had made significant strides in his educational progression.181  
Despite their child’s evident success at Firefly, Endrew’s parents agreed—
in good faith—to meet again with Douglas County representatives in 
November 2010.182  Douglas County presented Endrew with a new IEP, but 
Endrew’s parents deemed it no different than the one they had rejected 
months earlier.183  Accordingly, Endrew remained enrolled at Firefly.184  
Less than two years later, in February 2012, Endrew’s parents filed a 
complaint with the Colorado Department of Education requesting tuition 
reimbursement for Endrew’s placement at Firefly.185  Endrew’s parents 
argued that the IEP proposed by Douglas County was not reasonably 
calculated to provide Endrew with an educational benefit, that Endrew in 
turn had been denied a FAPE, and that Endrew was therefore entitled to 
 
 175  Id.   
 176  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 166, at 8. 
 177  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id.; see also Nic Garcia, Minimum Progress for Students with Disabilities 
“Preposterous,” Betsy DeVos Says in Denver, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2017/09/13/minimum-progress-for-students-with-
disabilities-preposterous-betsy-devos-says-in-denver.  Firefly is a private Denver-based 
autism center that specializes in educating children with autism.  Id.  Tuition at Firefly costs 
over seventy-thousand dollars a year, where funding comes primarily from public school 
districts, but Medicaid and private insurance carriers also contribute.  Id.  Only one percent of 
Firefly’s funding comes out-of-pocket from families who enroll their children there.  Id. 
 180  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996. 
 181  Id. at 997. 
 182  See id. 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id.   
 185  Id. 
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tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.186  The Administrative Law Judge 
disagreed, however, and denied the request for tuition reimbursement.187 
Endrew’s parents subsequently filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado.188  While acknowledging that Endrew’s 
progress under his previous IEPs “did not reveal immense educational 
growth,” the District Court nonetheless concluded that Endrew’s “past IEPs 
revealed a pattern of some progress on his education and functional goals, 
and that [his] proposed IEP for the fifth grade continue[d] that pattern.”189  
“[A]lthough this [did] not mean that [Endrew] achieved every objective, or 
that he made progress on every goal,” the District Court found, “the evidence 
show[ed] that [Endrew] received educational benefit while enrolled in 
[public school].”190  In other words, because Endrew’s past IEPs had been 
reasonably calculated to enable him to make some progress, the IEP at issue 
was therefore reasonably calculated to do the same.191  And this progress, 
albeit less than what Endrew’s parents had desired, nonetheless satisfied the 
“some benefit” standard adopted from Rowley. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.192  Predicated on Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinion in Thompson,193 the Tenth Circuit reinforced the notion 
that it “ha[d] long subscribed to the Rowley Court’s ‘some educational 
benefit’” definition of a FAPE.194  In conformity with its sister circuits, the 
Tenth Circuit interpreted the “some benefit” standard to mean that a child 
has received a FAPE when the child’s IEP has been “reasonably calculated 
to confer some educational benefit,” and that benefit is “more than de 
minimis.”195  Applying the customary “some benefit” standard, the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that Endrew had not been denied a FAPE, because his IEP had 
been “reasonably calculated to enable [him] to make some progress” toward 
 
 186  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997. 
 187  Id.   
 188  Id.   
 189  Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, No. 12-2620, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128659, at *30–32 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) (emphasis added).  
 190  Id. (emphasis added). 
 191  Id.   
 192  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997. 
 193  Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“[Endrew’s parents] ask that we now expressly overturn Thompson . . . the case relied on by 
the [Administrative Law Judge] and the district court for the ‘some educational benefit’ 
standard.  That we cannot do.  We are bound by Thompson.”). 
 194  Id. at 1338. 
 195  Id. (emphasis added).  
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his academic objectives.196  Noting that it was bound by Thompson,197 the 
Tenth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that it could not abandon the “some 
benefit” standard “absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary 
decision by the Supreme Court.”198  In almost prophetic fashion, one year 
later the Supreme Court took its first step toward the latter.  Indeed, in the 
autumn of 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.199 
B. Rowley No More: Endrew F. Sets a New Standard 
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down perhaps the most 
impactful special education decision since Rowley.  Writing for the 
unanimous Court,200 Chief Justice Roberts opened the opinion in observance 
of the “more difficult problem” that Rowley had declined to address thirty-
five years prior: determining at which point students with disabilities have 
been provided with sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the IDEA.201  
In confronting that problem, the Court explicitly overturned the decision of 
the Tenth Circuit—and sunset the “some benefit” standard in the process.202 
Addressing Douglas County’s argument that, under Rowley, “an IEP 
need not promise any particular level of benefit, so long as it is reasonably 
calculated to provide some benefit,” the Court found the school district’s 
interpretation of Rowley mistaken.203  First, the Court saw “little 
significance” in the language of Rowley requiring states to provide 
instruction “reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit,” 
because, as the Court noted, Rowley had no reason to articulate anything 
more specific.204  Second, the Court observed how Rowley acknowledged the 
 
 196  Id. at 1342 (“It is clear . . . that [Endrew was] thriving at Firefly.  But it is not [Douglas 
County]’s burden to pay for his placement there when [Endrew] was making some progress 
under its tutelage.  That is all that is required. . . .  [The IDEA] calls for the creation of [an 
IEP] reasonably calculated to enable the student to make some progress towards the goals 
within that program.”).  
 197  Id. at 1340. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Endrew F., 798 F.3d 1329, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 29 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-
827). 
 200  The decision was technically only 8-0 because Justice Scalia had passed away the 
previous year, and Justice Gorsuch had not yet been confirmed at the time of the Court’s 
decision.  Laura McKenna, How A New Supreme Court Ruling Could Affect Special 
Education, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/ 
03/how-a-new-supreme-court-ruling-could-affect-special-education/520662.   
 201  See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017); see also 
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982) (“The determination of when handicapped 
children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the [IDEA] 
presents a more difficult problem.”). 
 202  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000. 
 203  Id. at 998. 
 204  Id. (noting that Rowley involved a child whose academic success clearly demonstrated 
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“difficult problem” in determining “when handicapped children [were] 
receiving sufficient educational benefits,” but still refused “to establish any 
one test for determining the adequacy” of such benefits.205  Combining these 
two premises, the Court put the final nail in the coffin: 
It would not have been “difficult” for us to say when educational 
benefits are sufficient if we had just said that [some] educational 
benefit was enough.  And it would have been strange to refuse to 
set out a test for the adequacy of educational benefits if we had 
just done exactly that.  We cannot accept [Douglas County’s] 
reading of Rowley.206 
Accordingly, the Court put to rest the “some benefit” standard, replacing it 
with a new, heightened standard.207  Today, a school satisfies its obligation 
under the IDEA when it provides an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to 
enable [the] child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”208  And as ambiguous as this new standard may sound, the 
Court described it as “markedly more demanding” than the “some benefit” 
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit.209  “The IDEA,” the Court held, 
“demands more.”210  Just how much more, however, remains subject to 
interpretation. 
C. Deciphering Endrew F.: What it Means, and What it Does Not 
Justice Alito foreshadowed the difficulty of crafting an opinion “that 
ha[d] just the right nuance to express” how much should be demanded of 
public schools.211  To be clear, however, Endrew F.’s reasoning was sound.  
Indeed, it would have made little sense for Rowley to explicitly refuse to say 
when educational benefits were sufficient if it had intended for any benefit—
“some benefit”—to satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirement.  But as is 
oftentimes the issue, the problem hinges on interpretation of the text—and 
Nietzsche famously cautioned against letting text disappear under 
interpretation.212 
 
that her IEP was reasonably calculated to provide sufficient educational benefits, and 
therefore, Rowley was not concerned with establishing a workable standard for closer cases).  
 205  Id. (emphasis in original).  
 206  Id.   
 207  See generally id. 
 208  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (emphasis added). 
 209  Id. at 1000. 
 210  Id. at 1001.  
 211  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 47. 
 212  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
FUTURE 37 (Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Judith Norman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
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1. What Endrew F. Said 
By describing the new standard as “markedly more demanding” than 
the “some benefit” standard, the Supreme Court evidently raised the bar for 
the level of educational benefit that public schools must provide to students 
with disabilities.213  Moreover, because Endrew F.’s standard is “markedly” 
more demanding than the “some-benefit” standard,214 there are questions as 
to whether Endrew F. also raised the “meaningful benefit” standard 
previously used by federal circuits.  Indeed, courts and scholars alike have 
questioned whether there was even a difference between the “meaningful 
benefit” and “some benefit” standards to begin with.215 
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion did not once mention the “meaningful 
benefit” standard, nor did it use the modifier “meaningful” to describe any 
part of the new standard.216  This may suggest that the Court did not choose 
between the “some benefit” and “meaningful benefit” standards, but rather 
charted a new, heightened standard.  And to be sure, this problem of 
interpretation has already posed issues for lower courts.  For example, in 
light of the Tenth Circuit being overruled, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
that it too would have to raise its standard to align with Endrew F.217  On the 
other hand, some courts that used the “meaningful benefit” standard have 
interpreted Endrew F. as simply confirming that standard.218  And other 
courts have simply been unsure of the decision’s impact.219 
 
 213  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000. 
 214  Id.  
 215  Compare Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 118, at 20–21 (noting that it is impossible 
to be sure whether these two different standards result in drastically different outcomes for 
cases in circuits using different standards), with Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A 
Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J. L. & EDUC. 25, 27 (2012) (“Using one standard or the other 
can dramatically affect the outcome of a case and the services provided to a student.”); see 
also Systema v. Acad. Sch. Dist., 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Admittedly, it 
is difficult to distinguish between the requirements of the ‘some benefit’ and the ‘meaningful 
benefit’ standards.”). 
 216  See generally Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988. 
 217  M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE standard is similar 
to that of the Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F.  We have cited to the Tenth 
Circuit’s standard in the past, including that court’s decision in Endrew F. itself.”).   
 218  K.D. v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141428, 
at *19 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2017) (“According to the School District, Endrew F. simply 
confirms the standard that has been used in the Third Circuit for years. . . .  I agree with the 
School District. . . .  The [Supreme] Court rejected an interpretation that Rowley’s ‘some 
educational benefit’ means only ‘some’ benefit or a benefit that is ‘merely . . . more than de 
minimis.’”); see also Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s standard, not ours.  On the 
contrary, Endrew F.’s language parallels that of our precedents.”). 
 219  J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 690 F. App’x 53, 55 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“Because we conclude that the School District failed to provide [plaintiff] with a free and 
appropriate public education under the existing precedent in this circuit, we need not decide 
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2. What Endrew F. Did Not Say 
In analyzing what Endrew F. actually said, it may also be helpful to 
explain what it did not.  Perhaps most significantly, the Court explicitly 
declined to adopt the view held by Endrew’s parents.220  Endrew’s parents 
argued that the IDEA required “an education that aims to provide a child 
with a disability opportunit[ies] . . . that are substantially equal to the 
opportunities afforded [to] children without disabilities.”221  In response, the 
Court explained that this standard was “strikingly similar” to the one plainly 
rejected in Rowley as “entirely unworkable.”222  Accordingly, the Court 
refused “to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly at odds with 
[Rowley].”223 
More instructive was the Court’s meet-me-halfway approach to the 
Department of Justice, which appeared as amicus curiae in support of 
Endrew’s parents.224  During oral argument, Irving “Irv” Gornstein, 
Counselor to the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, argued on 
behalf of Endrew’s parents that a FAPE should require “a program that is 
aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”225  When asked by Justice Sotomayor if “meaningful” could 
replace “significant,” Mr. Gornstein responded that he interpreted 
“‘significant’ [as] synonymous with ‘meaningful.’”226  But Mr. Gornstein 
also cautioned that the word “meaningful” carried what he described as 
“baggage”—interpretational ambiguity—in various federal circuits.227  
Accordingly, he tried to steer the Court away from “meaningful” and more 
toward “appropriate.”228  As such, Mr. Gornstein proposed the following 
language: “reasonably calculated to make progress that is appropriate in light 
 
whether Endrew F. raised the bar for a free and appropriate public education or left Second 
Circuit precedent intact (the Supreme Court’s decision certainly did not reduce the force of 
the requirement).”).  
 220  See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.  
 221  Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827) 
(emphasis added)). 
 222  Id. (“This standard is strikingly similar to the one the lower courts adopted in Rowley, 
and it is virtually identical to the formulation advanced by Justice Blackmun in his 
[concurrence] in that case. . . .  But the majority rejected any such standard in clear terms.”). 
 223  Id. (“The requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities would . . . 
seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and 
comparisons.”).  
 224  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 19. 
 225  Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
 226  Id.  
 227  Id. at 21.  
 228  Id. (“The only [word] I would urge you away from actually is ‘meaningful.’  And the 
reason is that it has baggage in various courts of appeals.  It means different things to different 
courts, and it has been applied in different ways by different courts.”). 
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of the child’s circumstances.”229  The Court clearly took solace in that 
formulation, seemingly as a midpoint between Douglas County’s “some 
benefit” standard and Endrew’s parents’ “substantially equal” standard.  
Indeed, the standard articulated in Endrew F. is almost verbatim the one 
proposed by Mr. Gornstein: “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make 
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”230 
In choosing this particular language, the Court understood that 
“appropriate” progress would differ depending on the child at issue.231  The 
Court even refused to “elaborate on what ‘appropriate’ would look like from 
case to case,” because as it correctly foresaw, “[t]he adequacy of a given IEP 
turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created.”232  
Indeed, the creation of an IEP requires forward-thinking decisions by both 
school officials and parents—oftentimes a heavily fact-intensive task.  And 
this might be why the Court replaced a bright-line “some benefit” rule with 
a fact-intensive “appropriateness” one. 
But therein may lie the problem.  By crafting a highly fact-intensive 
solution to a problem that is, in itself, highly fact-intensive, the Court perhaps 
generated too much room for interpretation among parents, school districts, 
hearing officers, lawyers, and ultimately, judges.  These uncertainties will 
likely impose real costs for struggling school districts, both in pre-planning 
and risk management, as well as defending against litigation.  Indeed, Justice 
Breyer’s fear may very well prove true, in that “the money that ought to go 
to the children [will be spent] on lawsuits and lawyers and all kinds of things 
that are extraneous.”233 
Of course, there are two sides to every story.  While the “some benefit” 
bright-line standard may have offered greater predictability for parents and 
school districts, it was much more susceptible to abuse by the latter.  This 
was one concern of Endrew F.234  But even so, it might be unfair to broadly 
accuse school districts of not fulfilling their IDEA obligations because they 
want to cut costs.  In a perfect world, public schools would be generously 
funded and never have to implement cost-saving measures. Needless to say, 
however, this world is far from perfect.  Public school funding, 
unfortunately, is a zero-sum game. The more funding consumed by one 
curriculum, the less funding remains for the others.  In practice, then, if more 
 
 229  Id. at 24.  
 230  Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).  
 231  Id. at 1001. 
 232  Id.  
 233  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 15. 
 234  See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (“For children with disabilities, receiving instruction 
that aims so low would be tantamount to ‘sitting idly . . . awaiting the time when they were 
old enough to “drop out.”’”) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)). 
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money must be set aside for special education services—particularly to 
defend against accompanying litigation—then less money is available for the 
general curriculum.  And that is precisely the issue facing many struggling 
school districts. 
V. HOW ENDREW F. COULD AFFECT STRUGGLING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
A. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly—Minus the Good 
The IDEA has grown into the second largest federal program in 
education, providing states with roughly twelve billion dollars a year to help 
alleviate the costs of the six-and-a-half million students with disabilities in 
the United States.235  Recognizing the financial strain the IDEA would pose 
to school districts, Congress agreed when enacting the statute to cover forty 
percent of the additional costs of educating students with disabilities.236  But 
as this Comment has previously highlighted,237 Congress has all but 
abandoned that agreement.  In fact, Congress has never fully funded the 
program, routinely covering less than twenty percent of the costs.238  For the 
fiscal year of 2017, for example, federal funding covered only sixteen 
percent of the excess costs of educating students with disabilities.239  That is 
less than the seventeen percent covered in 2008, and much less than the 
thirty-three percent covered in 2009, which was inflated by the additional 
funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.240  In 
turn, this deficiency has been assumed by states, and more directly, by local 
school districts—many of which struggle to offset the deficit because their 
local funding pool is simply impoverished. 
And that is precisely the burden Endrew F. may inadvertently pose for 
struggling school districts.  Because Endrew F. seemingly raised the 
standard by a substantial degree, and federal funding is consistently 
inadequate, then more money will likely have to be expended on special 
education for school districts to avoid liability under Endrew F.  This may 
create serious difficulties for school districts where an impoverished local 
property tax base supports most of the educational funding.  Generally 
speaking, local governments collect local taxes from residential and 
commercial properties, and then funnel that revenue into school districts as 
 
 235  BLACK, supra note 21, at 472. 
 236  Id. 
 237  See supra Part II.C. 
 238  Id.  
 239  See FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 108, at 4. 
 240  “Full Funding” Debate, NEW AM.: EDUC. POL’Y, https://www.newamerica.org/educat 
ion-policy/topics/school-funding-and-resources/students-disabilities/federal-funding/full-
funding-debate/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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their main source of funding.241  In this system, wealthier localities have the 
ability to raise more money through higher property taxes, creating an 
abundance in resources that allows those wealthier localities to provide 
sufficient funding for their public schools.  Poorer localities, however, do not 
fare as well.  Impoverished school districts usually have reduced tax bases, 
which generate less funding to support their public schools.242  This means 
that disabled students who live in impoverished localities often attend 
schools with fewer resources, fewer qualified teachers, substandard school 
facilities, and diminished funding to rectify these issues.243  If and when these 
schools struggle to satisfy their obligations under Endrew F., financial 
liability attaches, which in turn exacerbates the overarching problem.  A 
cycle develops that proliferates to its own detriment. 
Furthermore, any time the federal education budget is reduced, the 
IDEA nonetheless prohibits cuts to special education programs due to its 
“maintenance of effort” clause.244  Scholars have criticized the IDEA’s 
“maintenance of effort” clause as benefiting neither taxpayers nor 
students.245 The clause effectively prevents states from reducing special 
education funding below the preceding fiscal year.246  In practice, then, if 
schools must reduce their education budgets (as is sometimes necessary), the 
IDEA prohibits cuts to the special education program.247  Accordingly, 
school districts may be forced to increase class sizes, lay off teachers, 
counselors, and nurses, or reduce enrichment programs in order to satisfy 
their obligations under Endrew F.248 
In addition, cuts to Medicaid could create a similar problem.  Medicaid 
reimbursements constitute the third-largest federal source of funding to 
public schools.249  Special education in particular relies heavily on Medicaid, 
 
 241  See Alana Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor School, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/property-taxes-and-
unequal-schools/497333/.  
 242  See id.  
 243  Id. 
 244  20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(18)(A) (2012). 
 245  See, e.g., Nathan Levenson, Boosting the Equality and Efficiency of Special Education, 
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. 32 (Sept. 2012), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/public 
ation/pdfs/20120905BoostingtheQualityandEfficiencyofSpecialEducation20120905Boostin
gtheQualityandEfficiencyofSpecialEducationFinal_.pdf (“[The ‘maintenance of effort’] 
provision says, in essence, that considerations of cost effectiveness have no place in special 
education.  It serves neither the needs of students nor the interests of taxpayers very well.”).   
 246  BLACK, supra note 21, at 472. 
 247  Id.  
 248  See Jonah Edelman, Trump’s Budget Fails to Put America’s Children First, HILL 
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/education/324128-trumps-budget-
fails-to-put-americas-children-first. 
 249  Emma Brown, GOP Health-Care Bill Could Cut Funds Schools Use to Help Special-
Ed Students, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education 
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but congressional proposals could trigger major cuts to the federal assistance 
program.250  The federal government subsidizes via Medicaid some of the 
expensive, but important therapies provided to students with disabilities, 
such as mental health therapy, speech therapy, and physical therapy, as well 
as equipment ranging from hearing aids to breathing and mobility 
apparatuses, and even specialized transportation.251  If that money 
disappears, the burden again falls on the states and, more specifically, local 
school districts.  This would impact not only the special education 
curriculum, but the general education curriculum too, because the general 
education budget will likely have to offset any loss of subsidies to the special 
education budget.252  When the average per capita spending on special 
education students is twice the average per capita spending on general 
education students,253 this counterbalance becomes particularly difficult to 
achieve for school districts already struggling to keep their heads above 
water. 
B. Two Birds, One Stone: How to Protect Both the Children and School 
Districts 
All methods of problem-solving can be broken down into a simple, two-
step process.  The first step is to recognize there is a problem.  The second 
step is to try to solve it.  While this Comment has highlighted the problem 
Endrew F. may pose for struggling school districts, there may also be some 
solutions to help alleviate these concerns. For one, Congress could limit the 
amount of tuition reimbursement that parents may recover from public 
schools after unilaterally placing their children in private 
programs.254  Described by some legal professionals as a “disabilities 
reimbursement reform,” such a cap on tuition reimbursement could be based 
 
/gop-health-care-bill-could-strip-public-schools-of-billions-for-special-education/2017/06/2 
7/05650ad4-5aa5-11e7-a9f6-7c3296387341_story.html?utm_ term=.a295626855a!. 
 250  Damian Paletta & Eric Werner, White House Budget Proposes Increase to Defense 
Spending and Cuts to Safety Net, but Federal Deficit Would Remain, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/white-house-budget-proposes-
increase-to-defense-spending-and-cuts-to-safety-net-but-federal-deficit-would-remain/2018/ 
02/12/f2eb00e6-100e-11e8-8ea1-c1d91fcec3fe_story.html?utm_term=.dd60904c9c85; see 
also Jennifer Steinhauer, Republicans Look to Safety Net Programs as Deficit Balloons, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/us/politics/medicare-medicaid-
social-security-republicans-elections.html. 
 251  See Why Schools Are Worried About Medicaid Cuts Hurting Special Education, PBS: 
NEWS HOUR (May 22, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/schools-worried-
medicaid-cuts-hurting-special-education#transcript. 
 252  BLACK, supra note 21, at 471. 
 253  Id.  
 254  Kathleen Conn, Solving the Funding Problem After Endrew F. Decision, KING, SPRY, 
HERMAN, FREUND & FAUL (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.kingspry.com/solving-the-funding-
problem-after-endrew-f-decision/.  
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on a percentage of the costs of the particular private placement.255  
Alternatively, reimbursement for private tuition could be subsidized as a 
percentage of parental income, similar to how public schools implement 
free-and-reduced lunch programs.256  In any event, a statutory limit on tuition 
reimbursement may encourage parents to better cooperate with school 
districts, while at the very least discourage hastily-brought lawsuits.257  
Finally, such a cap would allow schools to fashion their budgets more 
effectively, as they would be on notice as to the amount of tuition 
reimbursement for which they may be liable, based on the number of IDEA-
eligible students within the district.258 
Most importantly, however, these solutions would help protect both 
students with disabilities and school districts.  On the one hand, students with 
disabilities would benefit from Endrew F.’s heightened educational 
standard, and their parents would still be able to seek tuition reimbursement 
if that standard is not met.  On the other hand, school districts would benefit 
from a statutory cap on tuition reimbursement that both limits their liability 
and allows them to better incorporate these liabilities into their budgets.  Two 
birds, one stone. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Endrew F. has become the newest champion of students with 
disabilities, rightfully assuming its place atop the mantle of special education 
law.  As such, some may find it unjustified to question Endrew F.’s good 
intentions—and understandably so.  Some may think the finger should 
instead be pointed at Capitol Hill, since it is Congress that has openly 
abandoned its financial obligation under the IDEA.  And those criticisms 
might be valid, in a vacuum.  But the public education system does not exist 
in a vacuum. Insufficient funding has plagued struggling school districts long 
before Endrew F., and will continue to do so long afterward.  Perhaps, then, 
the decision just becomes the straw that breaks the camel’s back.  Indeed, 
only time will tell whether Endrew F. creates more problems than it solves.  
For the sake of students with disabilities, we should hope not. 
 
 
 255  Id. 
 256  Id. 
 257  Id. 
 258  See id. 
